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In The Left Hand of Darkness Ursula K. 
L e G u i n described a species i n w h i c h the same 
persons functioned as both male and female. 1 
Most of the time they were neither, but for a brief 
period i n a regular twenty-eight day cycle, 
L e G u i n ' s " s c i - f i " Gethenians became, through 
casual sexual foreplay and chance, one sex or the 
other, carrying out their love-making i n hetero-
sexual pairs or groups. After two or three days of 
intense concentrated erotic activity, they returned 
to an asexual state—inactive, unconcerned and 
undifferentiated. N o one was pre-programmed, 
destined by nature to become male or female i n 
that a l l adult Gethenians had been both. T h e 
chi ldren produced by their unions reckoned des-
cent through mothers w h o had been, and w o u l d 
be, fathers of other children. 
T h i s ambisexuality, L e G u i n says, "has little 
or no adaptive value," but, it has important 
social implicat ions: no restrictions on the type of 
work people do, no rape, no sexual hierarchy, no 
sex-role stereotypes. Indirectly, L e G u i n specu-
lates, it could be related in I he absence of wars, 
and, more generally, of a l l forms of aggression. 
L e G u i n ' s vision of sexual equality and its 
consequences for a peaceful wor ld and harmon-
ious social organization have given the book a 
cherished place i n feminist literature. But since 
genital endowment is normal ly fixed for life and 
sexual activity is non-cyclical , and since we can-
not provide both sperm and ova, the concept of 
biological androgyny belongs to the domain of 
ancient myth and contemporary science fiction. 
Psychological androgyny is another matter, 
an idea that is at once more intuitively credible. 
Many persons who are uncomfortable wi th con-
ventional definitions of masculinity and femi-
ninity feel that a description of themselves w h i c h 
incorporates both is closer to the emotional pat-
terns and cognitive styles of both sexes. T h e term 
"androgyny" is anything but clear. It can mean 
that masculine and feminine characteristics serve 
as a dual resource to be drawn on according to 
whichever one is appropriate to a particular 
situation, or, it can mean that the two sets of 
characteristics modify each other i n a l l situa-
tions. Sandra L . Bern who has done pioneering 
work i n the field uses it both ways: 
[It] is possible, i n principle, for an indiv id-
ual to be both masculine and feminine, 
both instrumental and expressive, both 
agentic and communal , depending upon 
the situational appropriateness of these 
various modalities; and even for an i n d i -
vidual to blend these complementary modal-
ities i n a single act....2 
Androgyny can also mean that the duality is 
integrated and synthesized to form a new and 
different repertoire of behavioral predispositions. 
Most people who write about androgyny assume 
it is a single type wi th variations branching out. 
However, i n practice and i n various studies, we 
often f ind two types: androgynous men and 
androgynous women for w h o m the m i x is not 
the same. 
Despite the differences and inconsistencies of 
use, a l l scholars agree that androgyny does not 
alter i n any fundamental sense established socie-
tal norms. It is, as we shall see later, a fairly 
conservative goal. Heterosexual coupl ing re-
mains the dominant form of marriage. N o 
woman is called upon to repudiate child-bearing 
functions; socialization veers only marginally 
from the familiar and famil ial paths. Androgyny 
challenges the more traditional models of social 
life i n both private and publ ic places. Yet, it does 
not redraw or change the private/public bound-
aries, nor does it communalize or expropriate the 
private household. Other ideas have been more 
threatening to our institutions, and more cap-
able of evoking p r i m a l fears. Why, then, should 
this compromise, this modest idea be a matter of 
such contention? 
Is it, as one psychiatrist suggests, a deep 
unconscious envy of the " O t h e r , " a universal 
and, incidentally, infantile wish to deny our real 
differences and to avoid the pa in of a more 
mature recognition of the ineluctable biological 
fact?3 Or , is it nothing more momentous than an 
honest difference among scholars about the heur-
istic advantages of a concept? Between these 
extremes of subjectivity and objectivity is a polit-
ical scenario which holds that the oppression of 
women is, i n part, sustained by an ideal of 
feminity which disadvantages women for almost 
a l l positions i n public life. A t the same time, the 
ideal legitimizes male dominance i n the most 
important areas of decision-making. Thus , the 
subordinate status of women is a combination of 
role content and "learned helplessness"—in 
short, dependency. Liberation, then, demands as 
a m i n i m u m a broader definit ion of what is 
appropriate behaviour for women, wi th the 
burden of proof being placed on those who hold 
that biological differences, not social discrimi-
nation, account for the non-random character of 
part icipation i n a l l areas of social life. F inal ly , 
there is a question feminists raise but which is, as 
we shall see, not often dealt wi th i n the literature: 
Does equality require or presuppose a certain 
type (or range) of personality? 
What is interesting about the debate is that it is 
not between feminists and anti-feminists, but 
among feminists, an in-house controversy car-
ried on w i t h i n a common ideological frame-
work. Yet, the issues are divisive and capable of 
generating both heat and l ight . Some criticize 
the concept of androgyny because it does not go 
far enough; others think it goes too far. Some 
regard it as a long overdue adaptation to modern 
social organization, but sti l l w i t h i n a patriarchal 
social order flexible enough to accommodate the 
new psychological pattern; others regard it as a 
radical salvation tranforming patriarchal insti-
tutions and humaniz ing the impersonal forms 
of bureaucratic organization. T o some feminists, 
it is a step forward i n the development of non-
sexist thought; others, a step backward, and sti l l 
others see it as neither, a lateral move. T o some, 
it is a short transitional stage, l imited i n dura-
tion, whi le for others, it is the f inal stage i n the 
long social evolution of male-female conscious-
ness. 
T h e clarif ication and resolution of these and 
related issues is made more interesting but more 
difficult to disentangle by the fact that the 
androgyny debate cuts across both the h u m a n i -
ties and the social sciences, each wi th their dif-
ferent sensibilities, vocabularies and measures of 
validity. T h e tensions between positivist science 
and the normative disciplines, between quantit-
ative measurement and qualitative insight, be-
tween an immediate and an historical orienta-
tion are enacted i n the debate. As usual i n such 
situations, the ecumenical spirit survives after 
the faithful have returned to their parochial 
exclusivity. Psychologists tend to know only 
what their colleagues write. W i t h i n that forum 
they generate more refined aspects of the or iginal 
problem, while philosophers and literary critics 
withdraw to fol low their o w n discourses based 
o n their o w n agendas. 
O u r purpose here, then, is not to review the 
literature i n each of these intellectual disciplines 
nor to assess the state of the art, but rather to 
provide a more comprehensive view of the range 
of issues and the shape of the argument. For that 
reason, the material has been arranged themati-
cally rather than by special disciplines. First, we 
w i l l consider the concept itself and its place i n 
our knowledge. Then , we w i l l examine the con-
troversy about personality or social roles, w h i c h 
is fol lowed by discussions of androgyny and 
mental health, androgynous persons or androgy-
nous relationships, androgyny and feminist 
ideology, moral and historical issues. In the con-
c l u d i n g section, we w i l l discuss the larger issue 
of androgyny and/or equality. 
1. H o w useful is the concept of androgyny i n 
advancing knowledge? Eichler is not a strong 
advocate of androgyny, but does acknowledge 
that it is a "necessary step i n the evolution of 
non-sexist thought . " 4 Others w h o are more sup-
portive h o l d that androgyny is s imply a better 
way of describing a reality w h i c h presently 
exists, that the evolution i n behavior has already 
taken place, and that it remains only for our 
ideas to catch u p . 5 T h i s reasoning is sufficient 
justif ication to incorporate androgyny into our 
paradigms of psychology and sociology. 
T h e assumption here is that there is an ideal 
personality type (or a l imited number of person-
ality types) that is (are) congruent wi th a given 
social structure. Deviations from the norm pro-
duce strain for the indiv idual and can contribute 
to the malfunct ioning of institutions. A t the 
same time, changes are taking place i n the 
macrostructures which , i n turn, are conducive to 
the formation of other personality configura-
tions. 
A p p l y i n g this general proposi t ion to our o w n 
society, it is asserted that the traditional defini-
tions of masculinity and femininity were appro-
priate to a bourgeoisie and to an upwardly 
mobile middle class family i n the era of industrial 
capitalism. But that era has passed. Despite its 
l ingering traces, there is relatively little stigma 
attached to behaviour that merely mimics tradi-
tional masculinity and femininity or, goes fur-
ther, and departs from it significantly. Modern 
capitalism, based on monopolist ic markets, bur-
eaucratic organization, and the production of 
services, has led to family constellations as well 
as to new patterns of child-rearing and educa-
t ion. A l l of these together and i n combination 
wi th other factors have made the older constructs 
of masculine and feminine obsolete, and, wi th 
few exceptions, dysfunctional for institutional 
participation beyond ritualistic conformity. 
There does appear to be some evidence that a 
change has taken place w i t h i n the past two 
decades, wi th the rate of change being greater for 
men than women. 6 Caut ion should be exercised 
i n interpreting these results since we sti l l do not 
have long-term studies nor large sample popula-
tion surveys. If it is true that a change has been 
occuring, and that it has been occurring at a 
differential rate favouring men, it confirms indir-
ectly that persons located i n roles where the 
organizational changes are most rapid—indus-
trial structures—are adapting to a social reality. 
However, what is more significant is that these 
differential rates suggest that a new form of 
inequality may be emerging, inequality between 
the more and the less androgynous, between the 
fast-track leaders and the slow-track followers. 
In examining children and their patterns of 
socialization, the androgynous c h i l d of either 
sex is viewed with suspicion by others, such as, 
peers and teachers.7 Indeed, the adults expect the 
" t o m b o y " or "sissy" to outgrow the unusual 
cross-sex behaviour. (Paradoxically, androgy-
nous adults are better l iked by their peers than 
non-androgynous persons.) 8 
Critics of the concept of androgyny are often 
more critical of sex-role research than andro-
gyny. T h i s is to some extent true of Eichler, and 
even more so of M o r g a n . 9 Morgan argues that 
the concept of androgyny is a bundle of logical 
contradictions and faulty reasoning. One exam-
ple of the latter is the way pro-androgynists leave 
unexamined such problems as whether the pro-
file of androgyny is universal or culturally spe-
cific. O n the basis of her analysis, Morgan con-
cludes that androgyny is neither possible nor 
desirable. But her criticisms would apply equally 
well to the concept of sex-roles if, say, we were a l l 
born into an androgynous society i n which some 
academic said, "Let 's consider the concept of 
sex-roles." L i k e androgyny, the concept of sex-
roles w o u l d be neither sound logically nor desir-
able socially, yet, sex-roles exist and are not just a 
l inguistic phenomena. 
Psychologists have also criticized the concept 
of androgyny on the grounds that it perpetuates 
sex-role stereotypes.1 0 Sex-role research does have 
a place i n psychology, they maintain, but sex-
role stereotypes do not. T h e dissatisfaction here 
refers to the methodology of the androgyny stu-
dies where, i n order to draw up the profiles of 
"mascul ine" and " feminine , " the researchers ask 
their subjects to describe the types. Inevitably, 
then, the measuring instrument reflects attitudes 
w h i c h are, at best, coloured by self-interest and 
the biases of the culture. In Spence and H e l m -
reich's work, for example, h i g h school students 
were asked to define these polarities. 1 1 (This was 
an effort to get away from the class bias of using 
college students as subjects.) However, late ado-
lescence may well be a unique point i n develop-
ment, a period when sex-role differentiation is 
h ighly salient, most simplistic i n definit ion, and 
overwhelmingly present i n consciousness. 1 2 
In short, the critics c la im, the concept of 
androgyny is a reorganization of sex-role stereo-
type research, not a basic change i n our think-
ing . It appears to be fresh, but it remains wi th in 
the framework of existing definitions of mascu-
line and feminine. In order to control for this 
problem, Spence and Helmreich , for example, 
introduce into their scale David Bakan's distinc-
tion between "agentic" (male) and " c o m m u n -
i o n " (female) w h i c h they and he regard as u n i -
versal. However, the Bakan distinction, l ike 
Erikson's " i n n e r " and "outer" and Parsons's 
" instrumental" (male) and "expressive" (female), 
is by no means culture-free. 
2. A second issue concerns the theory of per-
sonality, or, to be more precise, the relationship 
between sexual identity and social roles. Pro-
androgyny psychologists argue that personality 
and the abil i ty to perform various social roles at 
home, at work, i n school or i n the communi ty 
are neutral, independent of gender. A l t h o u g h 
gender is essential for procreational activity, for 
reproduction, most of the years i n our life cycle 
are spent i n other activities where the competen-
ces required have no clear basis i n physiological 
differences. If gender-typing persists, it reflects 
rigidity or a cultural lag. 
Impl ic i t i n this is the assumption that h u m a n 
adaptation and survival are dependent on a 
learning process rather than biological destiny. 
T h e learning process itself is a measure of 
humanness; to the extent that it occurs and we 
are not guided or controlled by innate instinct, 
the outcomes are indeterminate. T h u s , sex-roles 
vary widely w i t h i n a given social system and 
even more so when they are examined histori-
cally or cross-culturally. 
Anti-androgyny psychologists argue that ana-
tomical and hormonal differences are too impor-
tant i n psychological development to be disre-
garded or undervalued. "Androgynists. . .have 
apparently dismissed the physical body alto-
gether." 1 3 Freud's particular theory of psycho-
sexual development may be flawed but he was 
correct i n recognizing the existence of infantile 
sexuality as well as the awareness of male-female 
differences throughout ch i ldhood and the way 
these differences lead i n diverse direct ions 
through puberty to sexual maturity. A l l o w i n g 
for m i n o r variations, the psychological differen-
ces between the sexes are so regular and consist-
ently patterned that we cannot account for them 
exclusively i n terms of socialization. 
E r i k Erikson's studies of children's play are 
often cited as conf i rming his distinction between 
"outer" (male) and " i n n e r " (female) spatial con-
ceptions that seem to be characteristic of men 
and women. But Paula C a p l a n , who reviewed 
studies of children's play and Erikson's work i n 
particular, found his investigations had not con-
trolled for social learning or socialization, and 
that his statistics d i d not warrant the conclusions 
he drew. 1 4 In her o w n work, when children were 
presented only wi th blocks, girls were just as 
interested i n constructing towers as boys; when 
they were presented only wi th miniature replicas 
of domestic artifacts, boys were no less incl ined 
than girls to create enclosed spaces. 
Nevertheless, the conceptual problems remain. 
C a n we understand personality and leave out 
our sexual biographies? What does personality 
mean if we can compartmentalize behaviour to 
such a degree that women who are passive i n the 
bedroom are assertive i n the boardroom? Per-
sonality is by definit ion that part of our behav-
iour which is not situationally specific. Rather, 
it is the stable core, the consistency of style i n 
behaviour that puts a special stamp, our o w n 
i n d i v i d u a l i m p r i m a t u r o n a l l of our activity. 
Theoretically, an observer could predict from 
observations of behaviour i n one setting to 
behaviour i n another. 
Sandra Bern says that of course it is important 
to be "able to look into the mirror and to be 
perfectly comfortable w i t h the body one sees 
there." 1 5 Yet, what we d o i n our social roles and 
how wel l we perform them is not contingent 
u p o n this body awareness. J u d i t h Bardwick, on 
the other hand, insists that a strong sense of 
gender identity is essential for our emotional 
security. 1 6 Wi thout it women are confused about 
their bodies and the unique function of repro-
duct ion. She then notes that men are not asked to 
surrender their sense of manhood as a condit ion 
for participation i n publ ic life. W h y should 
women give up their sexual identity? Carried to 
its logical conclusion, she says, androgyny w o u l d 
mean asexuality, an unnecessary and exorbitant 
price for social justice. A l l that women want or 
need is freedom from ignorance about their 
bodies, liberation from the sexism i n contem-
porary medical knowledge and biology; a better 
sense of womanhood rather than no sense of it. 
Bardwick begs the question of what " m a n -
h o o d " and " w o m a n h o o d " are, and whether they 
are ever strictly confined to the bedroom. In our 
society, for example, when men lose their jobs, 
they often feel they have lost their manhood 
w h i c h they may seek to recover vicariously 
through fantasies of " m a c h o " man. Unless one 
knew the cultural code, it w o u l d be diff icult to 
figure out these linkages. T h e point is that sexu-
ality can never be isolated from its mult iple 
social meanings. 
G o i n g back to Bern and Bardwick, the differ-
ence between them is the difference between a 
social psychological approach and a c l in ica l 
one, between focusing on social roles and social 
structure, on the one hand, and on problems of 
identity and sexual dysfunction on the other. It is 
an impasse that is likely to persist. 
3. C l i n i c a l problems aside, is androgyny a 
superior form of personality organization? Freud 
held the view that bisexuality, as he called it, was 
our or ig ina l state, but that i n the course of nor-
mal development we moved toward one polarity 
or the other. 1 7 Failure to do so w o u l d result i n 
abnormal behaviour. U s i n g different criteria for 
mental health, however, may lead to other pre-
dictions. If it is correct to say that androgyny is 
an adjustment to a transformed social structure, 
then androgyny should be a preferred mode for 
no other reason than the fact that it eliminates 
incongruence. Different criteria might be flexi-
bi l i ty , independence from group pressures and 
will ingness to engage i n cross sex-role behaviour 
without anxiety. Another criterion might be self-
esteem. 
T h e empirical evidence seems to support the 
first two. T h i s may explain why men who have 
more access to the better paying, more highly 
rewarded and more chal lenging jobs i n the work 
wor ld have gone so quick ly from traditional 
definitions of masculinity to androgyny, and 
why they have made male androgyny a more 
acceptable image than female androgyny. 1 8 W i t h 
respect to the second criterion—versatility—, 
there is evidence from Bern's experiments that 
men who scored h i g h on the androgyny scale 
w o u l d cuddle babies or, at least, not avoid such 
situations; s imilarly, women who were more 
androgynous were more w i l l i n g to engage i n less 
conformist behaviour. 1 9 W i t h respect to mea-
sures of self-esteem there is less agreement. 2 0 
4. If, instead of l o o k i n g at personality or roles, 
we look at relationships, a different view is 
obtained. Relationships are, after a l l , where we 
test equality. But very few studies examine rela-
tionships, and only one has used the term 
"androgynous re lat ionship." 2 1 In this case the 
relationship was marriage. T h e evidence is that 
there are some new tensions created by the libera-
tion of both persons and the assignment of jobs 
i n the household which neither partner saw as 
their domain . Whether this disharmony is per-
manently detrimental or leads to growth, whether 
it undermines the marriage but contributes to 
the emotional development of the individual 
partners are questions that have not been pursued 
i n any depth. T h e importance of this approach, 
however, is that it moves toward studies of rela-
tionships; that is, studies of equality. Meanwhile 
psychologists may wish to question whether it is 
the proper use of the term androgyny to describe 
an egalitarian marriage as androgynous. 
5. Tradi t ional ly , role-strain and status incon-
sistencies have been the source of conservative 
pol i t ical th inking . Does it apply here, too; do 
persons w h o score h i g h on androgyny have 
favourable or unfavourable attitudes toward 
feminism? O n e of the best designed studies 
intended to explore this constructed four scales 
of equality: equal opportunity, family equality, 
the double standard i n sexual morality, and the 
acceptability of female ini t iat ive . 2 2 T h e findings 
confirmed that men who score low on andro-
gyny scales are the most conservative. T h e results 
also reflected the ideological uncertainties of 
many women even when their androgyny scores 
were h igh . However, activists can take heart; 
androgyny w i t h a l l of its strains is a positive 
factor i n social change. In addit ion, their belief 
that there is such a creature as a "male chauvi-
nis t " is correct; he is not every man, but he is also 
not a phantom, not an angry or paranoid 
projection. 2 3 
6. W h i l e psychologists have been explor ing 
some of the empir ica l correlations between h i g h 
and low androgyny scores and a variety of 
dependent variables, a different type of question 
has been raised by philosophers. T o say, for 
example, that androgynous personalities are 
more adaptive and therefore superior i n their 
mental health or adjustment assumes something 
about ends. Adaptive to what? Joyce Trebilcot, a 
philosopher, has argued that there are no moral 
grounds for regarding androgyny as better than 
any other configuration of traits. 2 4 As we noted 
earlier, she argues for a pluralist ic model of 
society, a society w h i c h does not intimidate or 
disadvantage those who voluntari ly choose or 
feel more comfortable wi th traditional notions 
of masculine and femine. Androgyny is differ-
ent, an alternative mode, but not one to be pre-
ferred, rewarded or mandated. T h e desirability 
of tolerance takes precedence over the desirabil-
ity of androgyny. 
T h e argument for the moral superiority of 
androgyny rests to some degree on the idea that 
androgyny is our natural state, a healthy condi-
t ion that has been hidden or distorted by the 
dominance i n cultural life of an imposed male-
centered partiarchy, a system w h i c h created its 
o w n androcentric symbolic systems. Carolyn 
H e i l b r u n , professor of E n g l i s h literature, has 
d r a w n attention to a r i ch tradition of androgy-
nous images i n art, re l ig ion and literature. 2 5 
Androgynous gods have been worshipped i n 
Eastern religions; androgynous heroes have been 
part of our mythology; many of the greatest w r i -
ters, male and female, themselves androgynous, 
have created characters whose motivational com-
plexity lies i n the precarious balance between 
two sides of their nature. J u n g considered an-
drogyny to be an archetype of the unconscious 
m i n d projected as a vision of what we have been 
and what we might yet become: of h u m a n perfec-
t ion. Yet, it is the idealization that may make it 
imperfect. " M y fundamental objection to the 
conceptof androgyny," Cynth ia Secor writes, " is 
that it is rooted i n a static image of perfection, i n 
eternity, an image which cannot take into account 
the rough going of historical process." 2 6 
Secor touches on the weakness of psychologi-
cal research w h i c h lacks any comparative or his-
torical scale. T h i s is not necessarily an argument 
against androgyny. Her further reservation about 
Jung's concept of androgyny is shared by G e l p i 
and several others w h o f i n d a male bias i n i t . 2 7 
Literature, art, poetry and drama are replete wi th 
men whose beauty or nobil i ty of character is 
enhanced by softness and sensitivity; i n contrast, 
there is almost no comparable image of women 
driven by pol i t ical ambit ion. Joan of Arc , El iza-
beth the First, Queen Victor ia , G o l d a Meir , 
Margaret Thatcher, Indira G a n d h i are seen 
more as deviants than models of h u m a n perfec-
t ion. Indeed, i n m u c h of our popular culture the 
female androgyne is pictured as a castrating 
wife, a domineering mother, a jealous man-
hating colleague, grotesque women with ringside 
seats at the gui l lot ine . Androgyny, according to 
D . A . Harr is , is "the sexist myth i n disguise . " 2 8 In 
addit ion, J u n g thought men w o u l d gain from 
an infus ion of the sensuous qualities of women, 
but women w h o took o n some of the properties 
of men w o u l d lose those very qualities of wom-
anliness w h i c h men, if they were to complete 
themselves must adopt. Jung's men w o u l d be-
come more humane, more loving and creative, 
but would still remain rulers and leaders; women, 
whether true to their nature or not, w o u l d con-
tinue to remain the ruled and the led. 
June Singer, a Jungian, regards this view as a 
misreading of J u n g . 2 9 Acknowledging that J u n g 
shared the male chauvinism of his day, she 
maintains that it is the spirit of his discussion 
not the letter that counts. Androgyny is not 
" w h a t " but " h o w , " not substance but method, 
not content but process. " T h e key to the new 
consciousness," she writes, " is the capacity to 
feel oneself i n the flow, i n process, and to focus 
on the dynamic interchange of energy that goes 
o n continually i n the open system to which we 
belong." Thus , the androgynous personality of 
either sex is more fully realized and becomes the 
dr iv ing force i n a self-correcting cybernetic sys-
tem; the male bias disappears since the duality 
w i t h i n each of us is being reborn. 
N o t a l l social theorists accept Singer's cyber-
netic model of society. If gender had no history 
and no historical significance, we w o u l d not be 
presently trying to change the social structure. 
One of the dissenting voices on androgyny is 
that of the late Herbert Marcuse. 3 0 T h e organiz-
i n g principle of past history, according to Mar-
cuse, has been the masculine principle of Per-
formance: exploitative, acquisitive and ego-
centric. T h e hope of any future civil ization is 
Eros, the feminine pr inciple . That being the 
case, there is no reason to retain, even i n partial 
or muted form, the discredited masculine p r i n -
ciple. Androgyny would only make women 
more l ike men i n a wor ld where any survival of 
Performance is regressive. 
Marcuse deduces the characteristics of women 
from activities related to motherhood. H e talks 
vaguely about receptivity, sensitiviy, non-vio-
lence, tenderness, but, at the same time, he re-
cognizes that these desirable nurtur ing charac-
teristics of women are not innate; they are learned, 
the consequences of being the second sex. S t i l l , 
he says, the " l o n g process of thousands of years 
of social condi t ioning means that they have 
become 'second nature. '" Feminist critics see the 
historical process differently, as having inflicted 
a p p a l l i n g damage on the psyches of women. 
T h e legacy of being the second sex is masochism, 
passivity, dependency, privatization—all of them 
negative i n terms of human freedom. 
For this reason, the eminent feminist (pro-
androgyny) theologian Mary Daly defines an-
drogyny as an end state of a redemptive struggle; 
it is not what we are but what we become. 3 1 
O r i g i n a l sin for women, she writes is complici ty 
i n sexism. If these habits and their charactero-
logical consequences are raised to become the 
dominant principle i n social life, women w i l l 
betray themselves once again. Feminism is noth-
i n g without the radical impulse to change both 
personal histories and the social wor ld . At the 
level of personality, the change is more than a 
change i n degree and something less than a 
change i n k i n d . T h e feminist struggle for struc-
tural equality, according to Daly, is the praxis 
through which women start to liberate them-
selves and, indirectly, to liberate men. L i k e S in-
ger who also emphasizes androgyny as a process, 
Mary Daly tends to trail off into metaphysics. 
A n n Ferguson, a Marxist , maintains that andro-
gyny, although desirable i n the abstract, is not 
possible i n class societies. 3 2 T o the l imited extent 
that some version of it does occur, it is among the 
highly educated, well-to-do privileged classes. 
A n y feminist revolution, then, must operate 
simultaneously on the social system and on the 
bases of personality, otherwise, one group of 
women w o u l d be liberating themselves at the 
expense of other women. Ferguson touches 
another weakness i n the debate—its sociology 
or the lack of it. Patriarchy has meant the exploit-
ation of women by men, but it has also meant the 
exploitation of some women—domestic servants, 
prostitutes and cheap labour—by other women, 
a phenomenon w h i c h operates against sister-
hood by contributing to a social distance between 
classes of women. 
T h u s , the androgyny debate continues unre-
solved. It continues to haunt our imaginations 
even after the various critics have scored their 
points. O n an analytical level, it remains impor-
tant for reasons indicated earlier: a social struc-
ture buil t on the principles of sexual equality 
requires a new personality type, a new motiva-
t ion where sex differences are inconspicuous to 
both the self and others; that is, where they can-
not be manipulated to the advantage of one sex 
or the other. If androgyny is not the motivational 
basis for this G o o d Society, what is? 
T h e concept of androgyny suffers from the 
same weakness as the concept of moderniza-
t i o n . 3 3 (Indeed, androgyny is to psychology what 
modernization is to sociology.) They both imply 
that patriarchy w i l l disappear, wither away, but, 
i n fact, just the opposite occurs: patriarchy is 
given a new lease on life; it becomes both mod-
ernized and androgynized. Meanwhile, the deeper 
equality eludes us. Neither concept—androgyny 
or modernization—can or should be discarded. 
They can only serve women when they have 
been integrated into a larger theory and vision of 
equality. In short, we have been put t ing the cart 
before the horse. 
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